The Last Warrior

By Phar Kim Beng
Founder/Chair
Strategic Pan Indo-Pacific Arena
Strategicpipa.com
Twitter: @indo_pan
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Strategicpipa

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The name Andrew Marshall is often spoken, either quietly or openly, with awe. He is one of the few Americans to have served more than eight presidents and fifteen secretaries of defense, going back to as early as the 1950s after the end of the Second World War. But his most indelible contribution is the method of “net assessment”, where instead of counting the defense equipment in one’s adversary merely, he would try to understand the interaction of those stockpile with the strategic doctrine at hand, coupled with the structural weaknesses of the regime, or, their strengths thereof, and ultimately, the lay of the land. The project, in other words, are projected, and detracted, based on numerous variables.

On the account of these diverse variables, Andy Marshall predicted the rise of asymmetric warfare by the militant Islamic groups, and the rise of China. China was considered the future strategic threat of the US in Asia by virtue of China’s imperial tradition and history, which in turn, interpose themselves in every region, and every part of the world, where China is seen as a putative alternative to the US. In other words, when the world calls you, or, lavish you with an impressive amount of compliments, you can’t help but be dragged into their orbit, even as you want them to be in yours.

Andy Marshall, who has a graduate degree in economics from the University of Chicago, understood such intentions and human deviance. That one could set up to stay divorced from the world, but when the compliments begin to pile, the restraint and discipline are lost. Very soon, it is mission creep all over again. The French advised the US prior to the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1948 that the Vietnamese are one feisty lot. The US did not listen and walked right into the Vietnam trap.

Andy Marshall could not have saved the United States every step of the way. But his leavening influence on the Pentagon, invariably, the White House and other agencies, proved helpful in guiding these generals and politicians. Without Andy Marshall, one would not have seen a vigorous Pentagon or Defense Department. This book is a chronicle on one of the United States' best nuclear strategists. One must hope that his skills would not be called and that Andy Marshall can continue to remain a fixture of the Pentagon to urge strategic restraint.